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December 21, 1970

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Ever since 1962, State Department officials have alluded to a vaguely defined "understanding" between John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev that the U.S. would not invade Cuba if the Soviets did not build strategic bases or install nuclear weapons there. Last month the White House let it be known that this understanding had been "renewed." In the meantime, however, the Cienfuegos base is all but ready to service Soviet nuclear missile submarines.

SEABED AND THE LAW OF THE SEA— TRIBUTE TO SENATOR PELL

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I want to acknowledge today the leadership of a man who, more than anyone else in the Senate, has brought our attention to the need for new international agreement governing the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the oceans. My distinguished colleague from Rhode Island, Senator PELL, knows well the loneliness of the long distance leader; for years he has been way ahead of us in recognizing the need and pursuing the goal virtually alone. But he has pursued it well, and we are now seeing some of the fruits of his leadership and influence in actions being taken by the United States and the United Nations.

On November 26, Senator PELL, as a U.S. representative to the United Nations, spoke on the seabed and law of the sea to Committee I. Addressing the need for a Law of the Sea Conference, he said:

The principal issues that need to be considered at the conference are familiar to all of us. There is the need for treaty arrangements on an international regime for, and definition of, the area of the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, including appropriate machinery. In addition there is the question of the breadth of the territorial sea and related questions of international straits and, conservation and management of the living resources of the high sea, including the interest of coastal states with respect to fisheries on the high seas. We and many other delegations also recognize the importance of taking conference action to secure effective regulation of marine activities to prevent pollution, taking due account of the forthcoming Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment and work of interested bodies such as the International Maritime Consultative Organization. If there are other matters which may be ripe for action, the conference should be free to consider them.

Last week, Mr. President, the U.N. General Assembly approved a declaration of principles governing the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, and also called for consideration of a Law of the Sea Conference in 1973. This action was an important first step leading to the recommendations made by Senator PELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator PELL's statement to Committee I on November 26, and the declaration of principles passed by the General Assembly be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR CLAIBORNE PELL

It is a great pleasure for me to join in the discussion of this item at the United Nations and at this particular time. I have followed the work of the Sea-Bed Committee since my distinguished friend and colleague, Ambassador Pardo, first proposed discussion of the sea-bed problem three years ago. Like him, I had for some time been concerned that the advancing pace of technology, both military and industrial, would soon signal a new area of conflict on the ocean floor. In the fall of 1967, I introduced in the United States Senate the first proposals designed to encourage international action on this item, and the following year I presented to the United States Senate a draft treaty on ocean space. I have followed ocean matters closely in my capacity as Chairman of the Oceans Space Sub-Committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate.

Looking back, I am sure that are many here who will understand when I say that there was a certain sense of loneliness then—the kind of loneliness that comes from the pursuit of a new idea which few appreciate and many are ready to criticize.

In these past three years I have participated as an advisor to the United States delegation to the Sea-Bed Committee in your work here at the United Nations. I have also taken an active part in discussions within my Government and with leaders of other Governments on these matters.

And so it was a great satisfaction to me that the oceans policy announced by President Nixon last May, and the proposals presented to the Sea-Bed Committee in August based on that policy, were not the fuzzy result of compromise, but a bold venture into the future. I am very glad too that the approach and many of the ideas contained in my original draft treaty are included in these draft proposals.

It is my conviction that when we look back upon the decisions made here, what we do on this question will be seen as one of those crucial turning points at which we either choose the path of hesitation, delay, and finally conflict, or we choose a braver course which may speed not just the development of the resources of the oceans, but the development of new patterns of cooperation our world so badly needs. We do not want to see a "flag nations" rush towards new colonial empires. Rather, we wish to see the ocean resources and usufruct available to all the world's peoples.

President Nixon expressed this theme in the General Assembly on October 23 when he said:

"It is in the world interest for the resources of the sea to be used for the benefit of all—and not to become a source of international conflict, pollution and unbridled commercial rivalry. Technology is ready to tap the vast largely virgin resources of the oceans. At this moment, we have the opportunity to set up rules and institutions to ensure that these resources are developed for the benefit of all mankind and that the resources derived from them are shared equitably."

A great deal of useful work has already taken place. Of particular note is the work of the UN Sea-Bed Committee under the able and respected leadership of its Chairman, Ambassador Amerasinghe of Ceylon. The work on seabed principles, on which he and others have labored so industriously and with such a great measure of success in recent weeks, is particularly heartening. We are pleased that, as the result of Ambassador Amerasinghe's skillful and tireless consultations within the Sea-Bed Committee he has been able to submit a draft declaration of seabed principles to the First Committee, and I shall comment on that text at the appropriate time.

The Sea-Bed Committee and this General Assembly have helped develop an increased understanding of the complex issues involved in developing an international regime governing the exploration and exploitation of the deep seabed, including appropriate machinery, reflected in the most recent report of the Sea-Bed Committee. The Committee has benefited from the Secretary General's excellent report on international machinery. Ambassador Galindo Pohl and Denorme have provided valuable leadership through their chairmanship of the Legal and Economic and Technical Sub-Committees, respectively.

At the last meeting of the UN Sea-Bed Committee, several proposals were made regarding the preparation of an international regime for the seabed. I am particularly happy that one such proposal was made by my own Government in the form of a draft, United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area.

I believe the draft Convention reflects the common interests of the international community in a seabed regime; interests which we already share, and which we will share more vitally in years to come. Among them are:

Preservation of the broadest possible precisely defined area of the seabed as the common heritage of mankind, open to use by mankind, open to use by all, with equitable sharing of benefits by all, particularly developing countries;

Preservation of the area exclusively for peaceful purposes;

Creation of new and uniform rules of law; Establishment of a new international organization with regulatory powers that permit it to adapt rules of changing situations and to ensure that rights and obligations are respected;

Protection of human life and safety and of the marine environment;

Protection of the interests of coastal States in the exploration and exploitation of resources; and

Creation, for the first time in history, of an independent, substantial source of international revenues to be used for international community purposes, particularly to promote the economic advancement of developing countries.

Much remains to be done. The exploratory phase of our work is now ending, and the negotiation of treaty arrangements must now begin. This is not the time to address the substance of these negotiations. But it is the time to decide that the problems will be solved by prompt international negotiation.

The moment is, however, a fleeting one. The technology is within our reach now. And now is the time that we must decide whether those who possess it will work out their own means of accommodation, or whether we will plan ahead for the equitable sharing of benefits from what is truly the common heritage, and perhaps the most valuable heritage, of mankind. In truth, this is the world's new frontier—and its last frontier where we have a choice of developing it sensibly and peacefully for the benefit of mankind.

Mr. Chairman, in stressing the importance of diplomacy keeping abreast of science and technology, I think this Committee's overwhelming commendation of the draft seabed arms control treaty is well worth recalling. That commendation evidenced a strong conviction to prevent the extension of the nuclear arms race to a new vast area. The wisdom of that decision cannot be contested. We must strive for a similar diplomatic ability to ensure the best use of advances in undersea technology which is now making the theoretical wealth of the seabed an actuality.

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Nations document signed by the U.S.S.R. Denial of these basic rights today at best reminds us of man's short memory about acts against humanity and at worst rekindles fear of a recurrence of one of man's darkest hours in Nazi Germany.

Elie Wiesel, a survivor of the horrors of Auschwitz and noted author, has written that civilization is but "foam that crests the waves and vanishes." Once again civilization is being challenged; it failed in World War II when it tolerated the intolerable. It is imperative that we not fail this time to speak loudly and clearly to Moscow in condemning this new wave of anti-Semitism.

The Soviet Union is finding its Jewish population a most handy scapegoat. The young Jews have dared to demand their rights to live in concert with their religious-cultural heritage. They have appealed to the United Nations Human Rights Commission, International Red Cross and other agencies. It is widely feared that the trial of the 34 in Leningrad is designed as a showpiece to dissuade others from similar attempts.

As we condemn these actions in the Soviet Union, it is important to remember and purge ourselves of our own tendency to look for scapegoats. Instead of examining the most fundamental causes of our manifold ills, we too often prefer to find an easily identifiable culprit, and then divert our anger, fear, or frustration toward him.

In the United States, as elsewhere, we find it easier to blame militants, doves, hawks, hard hats, intellectuals, or the mass media for problems in foreign policy, on campuses, in ghettos, in suburbs rather than looking for causes and then seriously trying to right fundamental errors.

Mr. President, the first candle of Hanukkah will be lighted on the evening of December 23. Hanukkah, the Festival of Lights, is the commemoration of the religious-cultural-political victory won by the Jews under the leadership of the Maccabees.

More than 2,000 years later, Soviet Jews are still struggling for the right to their own identity in the Diaspora.

Let us hope the weight of the world's moral indignation will persuade Soviet officials to abandon all forms of anti-Semitism; that this will be the last Hanukkah that cannot be observed freely by our Jewish brothers and sisters in Russia; and that we use our concern for Jews in Russia to strengthen our commitment to judge each man on his merits, to seek causes rather than scapegoats for our problems.

THE RUSSIAN SUBMARINE BASE IN CUBA

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to include in today's Record a story from the December 28 edition of Time concerning the Soviet building at Cienfuegos in Cuba. The story recites that:

U-2 reconnaissance photographs show that the base (at Cienfuegos) is almost complete. In addition to bunkers for storing submarine borne nuclear weapons, the Russians have built a steel antisubmarine barrier net between the shore and the Island of Cayo

Carenas and have installed antiaircraft emplacements. They have also built a pier for docking submarines and elaborate rest and recreation facilities. The Bay now contains two storage barges designed to receive the discharges of nuclear contaminated effluent from submarines. The tender that touched off the September announcement is still cruising the Caribbean, and could return to Cienfuegos at any time.

The story also mentions that in his most recent news conference, President Nixon said he was not worried by the base and did not regard it as a threat to our security.

Mr. President, I am quite frankly alarmed by this whole episode. I think the Senate and American public are entitled to a full and complete report on this base.

On October 14, on the Senate floor, I made the following statement:

If the early intelligence is correct and the Soviets are in fact developing a submarine base in Cuba, we will have to deal with only two alternatives: either the stand this Nation took in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 dies, or we take some affirmative counteraction, for the presence of such a Soviet nuclear sub base on our door step is incompatible with the reaffirmance in 1962 of the Monroe Doctrine.

I do not think, Mr. President, and I do not think other Senators believe, that the Monroe Doctrine should be discarded.

It is quite another matter if our early intelligence is wrong or has misled us. In that case there would be no problem of any magnitude. But if the early signs are correct, that the Russian Communists intend to have an operational submarine base in Cuba, then it behooves the United States to reassess its whole foreign policy vis-a-vis Soviet Russia.

Mr. President, I would urge most emphatically that the Department of Defense proceed immediately to determine, with the more than adequate means at its disposal, whether the Soviets intend to place a permanent submarine base or station in Cuba, and that it report to Congress and the American people the results of its investigation. If the Soviets have no such intention, we should know it. If the Soviets are building such an installation, we should know it and know it as soon as possible. It occurs to me that we have a right to know the full facts on this matter at the earliest possible date, so that we can take appropriate action. Candidly, I am not satisfied with the information which has so far been made available to the Congress.

Mr. President, I stand by that statement. It now appears that the Soviets are determined to build a nuclear submarine facility in Cuba. It is about to become an accomplished fact.

What shall be our posture in the face of this development? It seems to me that we cannot merely accept it. We must take a position—the postponements are over. I think it incumbent upon our Government to advise the Congress and the people of our position on this matter—of our intentions, of our policy.

We have heard and seen in the press a number of stories about the Soviet-American understanding at the time of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. The time has come, in my judgment, Mr. President, for a full statement concerning that understanding—we should know in the first instance whether such an understanding exists; whether we consider it binding; whether the Soviets

consider it binding; we should know what our obligations are under it and what the corresponding Soviet obligations are. We should know whether it has been breached by the construction of this Soviet missile base. I respectfully, but emphatically, urge the administration to speak to us on this issue—to assure the American people—to state publicly and for the record, our national position on this apparent crisis.

Mr. President, I repeat what I said in October: If we retreat in the face of this latest Soviet probe—if we acquiesce to the placement of a Soviet military facility of this magnitude in our hemisphere, we will not be winning security or stability or respite; we will be in effect inviting new and potentially more dangerous probes. The Soviets will understand our actions as weakness and we will inevitably be subjected to further, more sinister tests. If we acquiesce, we will not be avoiding the ultimate nuclear confrontation—we will be bringing it closer.

There being no objection, the article from Time magazine was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

CUBA

THE SUBS OF CIENFUEGOS

Last September the White House announced that the Soviet Union was building a base to service missile-carrying submarines at the south Cuban port of Cienfuegos. The news set off shock waves of fear that an East-West confrontation comparable to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis was imminent. But then the Soviets removed their submarine tender from Cienfuegos, and the moment of alarm seemed to pass.

Despite President Nixon's press-conference statement that he was unworried by Soviet naval presence in the western Atlantic, there is some evidence that the crisis has merely been postponed. U-2 reconnaissance photographs show that the base is almost complete. In addition to bunkers for storing submarine-borne nuclear weapons, the Russians have built a steel antisubmarine barrier net between the shore and the island of Cayo Carenas and have installed anti-aircraft emplacements. They have also built a pier for docking submarines and elaborate rest and recreation facilities. The bay now contains two storage barges designed to receive the discharges of nuclear-contaminated effluent from submarines. The tender that touched off the September announcement is still cruising the Caribbean, and could return to Cienfuegos at any time.

Double capacity

One U.S. naval official describes the Cienfuegos base as "smaller than Holy Loch and larger than Rota," referring to U.S. nuclear submarine bases in Scotland and Spain. It could service any of the Soviet navy's 76 nuclear submarines, including those of the Polaris-type *Yankee* class, of which the Soviets presently have 13. The practical strategic effect of the base will be to double the Soviets' nuclear submarine capability in American waters; one *Yankee* submarine will be able to perform a surveillance mission that required two such ships before.

The Nixon Administration faces a dilemma over how to react to the base at Cienfuegos. An outright confrontation with the Soviet Union, in an area deep within the traditional "U.S. sphere of influence," would almost certainly rule out the advancement of top-priority Administration objectives concerning the SALT talks, the war in Viet Nam, and the stalemate in the Middle East. The U.S. seems to be resigned to the presence of Soviet naval vessels in the Caribbean, with the sub-

Cuba

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A-Sub Base In Cuba Held Nearly Ready

NEW YORK, Dec. 20 (UPI) —The Russians have nearly completed a nuclear submarine base on the south coast of Cuba that could cause an East-West confrontation similar to the 1962 missile crisis, Time magazine said today.

The Time report said U-2 reconnaissance photos show that the Soviet base in Cienfuegos, Cuba, reported under construction in September, is near completion.

The magazine said the Nixon administration hopes to avoid a confrontation that might interfere with the SALT talks and other U.S.-Soviet ventures, but it is not certain that avoidance is possible.

Despite President Nixon's press conference statement that he was unworried by Soviet naval activity in the western Atlantic, there is some evidence the crisis has merely been postponed, Time said.

[The White House made clear the following day that the President was speaking specifically of the day of his conference.]

CUBA


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Despite President Nixon's press-conference statement that he was unworried by Soviet naval presence in the western Atlantic, there is some evidence that the crisis has merely been postponed. U-2 reconnaissance photographs show that the base is almost complete (see map). In addition to bunkers for storing submarine-borne nuclear weapons, the Russians have built a steel antisubmarine barrier net between the shore and the island of Cayo Carenas and have installed anti-aircraft emplacements. They have also built a pier for docking submarines and elaborate rest and recreation facilities. The bay now contains two storage barges designed to receive the discharges of nuclear-contaminated effluent from submarines. The tender that touched off the September announcement is still cruising the Caribbean, and could return to Cienfuegos at any time.

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within the traditional "U.S. sphere of influence," would almost certainly rule out the advancement of top-priority Administration objectives concerning the SALT talks, the war in Viet Nam, and the stalemate in the Middle East. The U.S. seems to be resigned to the presence of Soviet naval vessels in the Caribbean, with the submarines serviced in international waters from a tender based in Cuba. But it hopes that the Soviets will not force the issue by putting the Cienfuegos base into operation.

Ever since 1962, State Department officials have alluded to a vaguely defined "understanding" between John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev that the U.S. would not invade Cuba if the Soviets did not build strategic bases or install nuclear weapons there. Last month the White House let it be known that this understanding had been "renewed." In the meantime, however, the Cienfuegos base is all but ready to service Soviet nuclear missile submarines.

Soviet Tender Still Plying Caribbean

By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 2—High Administration officials are said to suspect that the Soviet Union is playing a maritime "cat-and-mouse" game with its submarine tender in the Caribbean.

"If I were the Russians, I'd run that ship around for the next six months," a senior official commented to a newsmen a few days ago. That is what Government analysts believe the Soviet Union is doing.

The 9,000-ton tender, of a class known as Ugra, has been the center of the controversy that has been simmering, both publicly and privately, between the Nixon Administration and the Kremlin since late September. It started when a Soviet naval squadron, for the third time in 15 months, called at the Cuban ports of Havana and Cienfuegos between Sept. 9 and 12.

Soon after, the principal Soviet ships, including a guided-missile cruiser and a guided-missile destroyer, sailed home. Several auxiliary vessels

including the tender and two special barges, remained at Cienfuegos. United States U-2 reconnaissance aircraft photographed the ships as well as new shore construction, and intelligence experts alerted the White House.

Before going abroad today, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird discussed Soviet naval deployment in the Caribbean.

A submarine base, he said, requires the presence of a tender, and "it's the tender that's the important thing." At the same time he said that there were no indications that a Soviet submarine had been serviced in Cienfuegos or other Cuban waters by the tender.

He said the tender was moving around in the Caribbean

and was now somewhere south of Haiti.

Asked whether he was surprised that it was still in Caribbean waters, he replied in the negative, but he said he would be surprised if it "serviced a Soviet submarine" in Cuban waters in view of a Soviet declaration in October that the agreement that ended the 1962 Cuban missile crisis was being adhered to.

Mr. Laird agreed that the accord did not preclude such servicing outside Caribbean waters.

"I assume that the tender will be used to service submarines in the future and I don't know what reason they'd hang on to it if they didn't service submarines," he added.

THE WASHINGTON POST

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Administration Deeply Disturbed

The Cuban Sub Base Affair

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Washington Post Staff Writer

Although it refuses to disclose details of the "understanding" with the Soviet Union over Cuba, the Nixon administration is deeply disturbed by Soviet activity at the Cuban port of Cienfuegos.

It is contended that the new "understanding" with

Moscow precludes the use of that port to support Soviet nuclear missile submarines. While no official will say directly that Moscow is violating the "understanding," officials do say the continued presence of Soviet vessels useful for submarine support is inconsistent with the "understanding."

It seems evident that Washington wants to warn Moscow but, thus far, also wants to avoid a direct public confrontation over the Cuban issue. Nevertheless, the issue has cast a deep pall over the whole range of Soviet-American relationships including such ongoing negotiations as those on Berlin and on the limitation of strategic arms.

"If the Soviet Union wanted to establish a basis of confidence with the United States, this is not the

way to do it," was the comment of one key official.

What follows is a run-through of the history and current status of the Cuban base affair, so far as it has been made public by the United States and the Soviet Union and from what officials are willing to say privately but not on the public record.

The administration has tried, and continues to try, to keep secret the details of the Soviet-American discussions leading to the "understanding." But press probing forced onto the public record Tuesday's formal acknowledgement that secret meetings had led to the "understanding" although there is "no document of record in writing."

See BASE, A4, Col. 1

This capital is full of skeptics, including men in high administration offices, who view the whole Soviet submarine base issue as essentially an exercise in domestic politics and/or in executive branch lobbying for more congressional funding for the Pentagon.

It is a fact that more than a month before the recent election some officials who knew what was going on said that President Nixon was afraid he might be faced with "a Democratic Keating." That was a reference to former Sen. Kenneth Keating of New York, a Republican who unsettled the Democratic Kennedy administration in 1962 also a congressional election year, with accounts of Soviet missiles moving into Cuba. President Kennedy later revealed such movements at the beginning of the Cuban missile crisis that October.

Others, who do not ascribe dark political motives to the administration, believe there is no "understanding" beyond what Moscow has publicly said and they expect the Soviet Union to keep port facilities at Cienfuegos for its submarines.

There also are those in Washington today who contend that the "understanding" now announced amounts to giving Moscow something for nothing. The argument is that the United States has publicly assured the Soviet Union that it has no intention to "invade or intervene" in Cuba in exchange for an unwritten Soviet promise to live up to a part of the 1962 missile crisis outcome.

Whatever political content was involved in Mr. Nixon's thinking, the elections are now past. But there is deep resentment in high administration circles over the substantive charge of giving something for nothing.

The administration's argument, it can be said authoritatively, is that there are only two ways to view the outcome of the 1962 crisis that led the world to the brink of nuclear war:

Either the then Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, agreed not to install offensive weapons in Cuba in exchange for an American pledge not to invade Cuba or he withdrew the missiles without any agreement—in which case Moscow was free to reintroduce such weapons and Washington was free to invade Cuba.

Hence, it is argued, since an American invasion is not in the cards, what is wrong with giving a non-invasion pledge now in exchange for Soviet agreement not to emplace offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba?

The details of just when and how the "understanding" was reached remain secret. But the available evidence indicates that it was reached chiefly through talks between Henry A. Kissinger, the President's foreign policy adviser, and Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Moscow's long-time ambassador in Washington. The evidence also indicates the "understanding" was reached around Oct. 10, a few days after Mr. Nixon returned from his European trip.

On Oct. 10, a Soviet submarine tender and a tug, which had first raised the Cuban base issue when they put in with two barges at Cienfuegos on Sept. 9,



During Oct. 22 meeting, President Nixon escorts Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko after 15-minute private chat.


two vessels put in at Mariel, near Havana on the north shore, administration officials dismissed this as meaningless, predicting that the ships soon would leave for home. They clearly felt that Moscow intended to live up to the "understanding."

The story of the talks first broke in the Chicago Tribune on Oct. 17 and in The Washington Post Oct. 18. The Tribune account said that "the United States forced Russia through secret talks to dismantle a Soviet submarine base being built in Cuba." Coming during the election campaign, the tone of the story helped create suspicions that the move was politically motivated. This was furthered by the remark on Nov. 2 of Herbert Klein, the White House communications director, that submarine base construction had been halted after the administration applied "strong but quiet diplomacy."

Klein's remarks stirred an internal storm and his right to speak on foreign affairs thereupon was severely curtailed by presidential order.

By the time of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's call on President Nixon at the White House on Oct. 22, Washington thought it had a firm and viable agreement. Given the delicate state of Soviet-American relations, in the wake of what was considered Soviet collusion in violations of the Mideast standstill and in view of the SALT and Berlin negotiations, the administration's hope was to be able to say nothing about the Cuban affair.

After Gromyko left the White House officials said they felt the Cuban issue had been dissolved because the vessels had left Cienfuegos and because Moscow had acknowledged a 1962 "understanding" and it now



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By Joseph P. Mastrangelo—The Washington Post

had been extended to cover potential submarine bases in Cuba.

But over the weekend of Oct. 31-Nov. 1 the submarine tender and tug arrived again at Cienfuegos. Even then officials privy to the "understanding" said they were not alarmed, guessing the ships would stay a few days and then leave. The arrival of the ships was made public on Nov. 9, six days after the elections.

A that point officials said that if the ships did not soon leave "we'll have another situation." The ships are still there and the new situation is what so disturbs the administration.

It was theorized here that, in returning the ships to Cienfuegos, the Soviet Union, perhaps was making the point that it had a right under the "understanding" to have its ships call at friendly ports.

In an official statement by the Soviet press agency Tass on Oct. 13, which the United States quickly and by predesignation termed "positive," the Soviet Union had coupled a statement that it "has not built and is not building its military base on Cuba" with a declaration of its "inalienable right" to have its ships call at friendly foreign ports, including Fidel Castro's Cuba.

But this week, U.S. offi-

cials said that the presence at Cienfuegos of the tender, tug and barges (the barges had never left) could not come under that classification. It can be presumed that representations on this point have been made to the Soviet Union.

On Tuesday the State Department spokesman, when asked if the presence of the ships at Cienfuegos constituted a violation of the "understanding," replied that his "judgment would be that it does not, but it requires careful and close scrutiny, which it is getting."

In essence, the administration does feel that a violation is involved, or certainly will be if the vessels do not quickly leave, but it has avoided creating a public confrontation with Moscow on the issue.

On Wednesday, there was a call in Congress for just such a confrontation. Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez (D-Tex.) said in a floor speech, "It is time that we confront Russia and determine what is going on in Cuba." Rep. Paul G. Rogers (D-Fla.) called on

President Nixon "to make public any and all agreements which concern Cuba," adding that "Congress and the people of the United States have a right to know" what they are.

The Tass statement of Oct. 13 said Moscow "is not doing anything that would contradict the understanding reached" with Washington in 1962. Moscow, it added, "has always strictly adhered to this understanding, will adhere to it in the future, too, and proceeds from the assumption that the American side will also strictly fulfill this understanding."

But was there an "understanding" at the end of the 1962 crisis?

On Oct. 13 when State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey characterized the Tass statement as "positive" he also was prepared, if asked, to say that there was no understanding in 1962. The reason: Castro failed to permit United Nations inspection of the Soviet missile withdrawal, a part of the public Kennedy offer of an agreement to Khrushchev. But nobody

asked McCloskey that question.

According to Elie Abel's 1966 book on the missile crisis, Robert Kennedy assured Dobrynin on Nov. 20, 1962 that if the Soviet bombers started moving out the President would issue his no-invasion pledge within 30 days. The bombers did leave the last one on Dec. 6.

On that same Nov. 20, however, President Kennedy at a press conference said "important parts of the understanding" with Khrushchev "remain to be carried out" and he mentioned Castro's refusal to permit U.N. inspection. He never issued a public no-invasion pledge. Castro in 1966 asserted that the United States had made several secret concessions to solve the crisis but he would give no details. The State Department denied his claim.

On Sept. 25 of this year about 10 days or two weeks after Washington concluded a submarine base was being put together in Cienfuegos, a White House official, not identifiable, said that the Soviet Union "can be under no doubt that we would view the establishment of a strategic base in the Caribbean with the utmost seriousness."

He cited the Kennedy words from that Nov. 20, 1962, press conference that "if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean." The official cited no "understanding" from 1962.

On Nov. 13, in making the first partial disclosure of the new "understanding" McCloskey did not claim one from 1962. He put it this way: "In view of President Kennedy's press conference statements on Nov. 22, 1962, and to which this administration has referred, and the Soviet government's statement issued by Tass Oct. 13 this year, we are confident that there is understanding by the two governments of the respective positions on the limits of their actions with regard to Cuba."

Five days later, this was expanded by McCloskey into an unwritten "understanding" reached this fall by private talks. In short, the administration now was conceding that it had done what President Kennedy had not done, at least on the public record, despite the Soviet contentions: given a pledge not to invade Cuba.

The administration contends that in return it now has an "understanding" which precludes what it had feared was afoot in Cienfuegos, the creation of a base or facility, whether it be a

"Soviet" or a "Cuban" facility, that could be used to service Soviet submarines carrying offensive nuclear weapons.

It is added that the United States, as McCloskey said, has no intention to "invade or intervene" in Cuba. Ergo, it was a worthwhile deal for the U.S., it is contended.

But what now troubles the administration is the fact

that, in its view, Moscow is not living up to its part of the new "understanding" for reasons that are unclear. Construction continues at Cienfuegos, including a road around the harbor, and barracks are ready to receive sailors on port leave. As of yesterday, officials said, the tender, tug and two barges

Russia Has Sub Facility, Not Full Base, in Cuba

By JEREMIAH O'LEARY
Star Staff Writer

While official Washington agonizes over Russian submarine activity in Cuba and what the United States ought to do about it, the central fact emerges that the Soviet navy already has established a facility at Cienfuegos adequate to meet the needs of its Yankee and Echo-class nuclear-powered submarines.

All the background briefings and press sessions at the White House, the Pentagon and the State Department have created a hangup on the words, "submarine base."

The single word "base" conjures visions among American officials, press and public alike of something on the order of a huge establishment like Norfolk, Charleston or San Diego.

Serviced by Tenders

What the Russians actually have put together and what is causing the concern and confusion ought to be called a "facility." It is a rather simple servicing stopover designed for minimal resupply and recreation of crews.

The Russians' new facility on the south coast of Cuba is as complete as it needs to be

in order to supply the needs of Soviet nuclear submarines.

U.S. sources close to the Cienfuegos situation point out that a Soviet submarine operating in the western Atlantic, or anywhere else in the world, normally would be serviced by seagoing tenders. Anything but major repair work can be and is done by these tenders. Nuclear submarines do not need refueling; their reactors

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are good for at least two years of operation.

But tenders cannot provide relaxation for crews or the kind of recreation that submariners need after long periods at sea, mostly submerged. Similarly, a facility such as Cienfuegos is useful for providing the submarines with fresh foods that a tender might run out of.

From aerial photography and other sources of information, it is clear to U.S. officials that the Russians have not installed a major base at Cienfuegos. But they have established there all they need.

There are several barracks for crews and a soccer field. (Cuba is a baseball-playing country and soccer fields do not abound.) There are buoys for submarines to tie to; two powerless barges for minor servicing and disposal of radioactive wastes, and there is a tender of the Ugra class which has been tracked from the Murmansk area of Russia to Cienfuegos, around the north side of Cuba to Mariel and now back to Cienfuegos.

U.S. Navy men know from their own bases at Holy Loch, Scotland, and other places that the needs of nuclear submarines are not extensive.

The U.S. keeps about 40 nuclear submarines on active service, scattered around the world but generally ringing the Soviet Union and able to launch 16 missiles each at

pre-designated targets. The event of a nuclear exchange. Russia is thought to have between 11 and 14 Yankee and Echo-class nuclear subs, more or less similar to the Polaris, and it is believed at least three of these are always on station off the North American mainland.

The question facing President Nixon, the National Security Council and the Pentagon is not what the Russians are doing. It appears they have done it. The question really is: Does a facility like Cienfuegos pose a threat to the U.S.?

The issue has become clouded by statements from Pentagon spokesman, White House spokesmen, State Department spokesmen and others about the terms of a so-called "understanding" between the United States and the USSR at the time of the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.

Through all the uncertainties, closely held secrets and hair-splitting about this "understanding," it is generally believed that Russia withdrew its missiles and promised not to create any offensive bases in Cuba in return for a U.S. guarantee not to invade Cuba. Almost forgotten is a part of that bargain that Fidel Castro did not keep: the permission for inspection of Cuban sites that might be considered threats to the U.S.

It also appears that U.S. officials of the highest level discussed the Cienfuegos situa-

tion with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin after the activity of the tender and barges was discovered there in August. The "understanding" of 1962, it is said, still prevails.

But the real point is whether the United States will decide that even a "facility" at Cienfuegos is a threat or whether Washington will decide that a "facility" is not a "base" and therefore can be regarded as less than a clear and present danger.

Crisis or Incident

Officials' comments in Washington over the last few weeks indicate the United States cannot quite decide whether it is faced with a crisis or an incident. Various departments and officials interpret the situation with differ-

The Pentagon, for example, has come close to characterizing the Cienfuegos situation as being nearly as critical as the missile confrontation when the world came perilously close to World War III.

A White House spokesman, now widely known to be Henry Kissinger, also talked to reporters for background and said the USSR could have no doubt that the United States would take the most serious view of a submarine base if one were established in Cuba.

The State Department speaks of the "understanding" as if the agreement is based

totally on what is publicly known of the things President John F. Kennedy said to Premier Nikita Khrushchev and what Khrushchev said to Kennedy. This boils down to the "no bases, no invasion" stand-off.

In this situation, there is a foginess of precise meaning in determining how a base differs from a facility and how it is decided whether a base or a facility are offensive or defensive and whether either is a threat.

So while most of the public airing hinges on the meaning and extent of the mysterious U.S.-USSR "understanding," the real question is one of intent.

Having constructed a facility on the south side of Cuba, do the Russians intend to make use of it? Have Russian nuclear submarines indeed begun to make Cienfuegos a port of call for servicing, resupply, rest and recreation or will they do so in the future? If one or more Russian submarines does stop at Cienfuegos, will the U.S. concern escalate to the same pitch as the 1962 brink?

These questions presumably are what the President and his advisers now are trying to sort out. But it is far less clear-cut a matter for them to decide than President Kennedy faced in 1962.

U.S. Officials Say Soviet Has Given Assurances

That Nuclear Arms Will Be Kept Out of Hemisphere

By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 17 — State Department officials said today that the United States had received private assurances from the Soviet Union that it would not introduce offensive weapons into the Western Hemisphere or establish bases for the use of such weapons. It was understood that "offensive weapons" in this

context was synonymous with nuclear weapons.

The officials said that the assurances reinforced the Oct. 13 statement by the Soviet press agency, Tass, denying United States allegations that the Russians were building their own military base in Cuba. The officials declined to specify where, when or in what form the assurances had been received.

They refrained, however,

from challenging reports of personal meetings in New York last month by Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's advisor on national security affairs, with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, and Anatoly F. Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador.

They also reiterated the statement that the Nixon Administration was confident that it had an understanding with

the Soviet Union on the issue although they said there was no document of record to affirm the understanding.

Commitment Not to Invade

The United States portion of the understanding described as a commitment not to invade Cuba. The officials cited President John F. Kennedy's pledge to that effect at his news conference on Nov. 20, 1962, following the removal of Soviet

nuclear weapons from Cuba on Nikita S. Khrushchev's orders.

Asked whether the Russians still regarded that commitment as valid, Robert J. McCloskey, the State Department spokesman, replied, "I would assume so."

Mr. McCloskey said that Soviet naval craft—including a submarine tender and two barges used to collect radioactive effluent from nuclear submarines' reactors—were still at Cienfuegos. Their con-

tinuing presence, he said, would not be construed as a violation of the unwritten understanding.

However, he said, they will require close and careful scrutiny. He sidestepped a direct answer when asked whether continuing construction of Soviet shore facilities at Cienfuegos would, in itself, be viewed as a violation of the agreement.

Asked whether it was understood between Washington and Moscow that the Soviet Union

would neither build its own military base, as specified in the Tass statement, or a base for Cuba or for any other country to which the Soviet Union would have access, Mr. McCloskey replied, "Yes."

He added that the understanding on the part of the Nixon Administration covered the entire Western Hemisphere.

He said that the Communist Government headed by Premier Fidel Castro had not been a party to the private exchange

of assurances between United States and Soviet officials.

A Defense Department source said that there had been no reports of Soviet ship movements in or out of Cienfuegos in the last 24 hours. Last week well-placed sources said that they expected the 9,000-ton submarine tender to leave Cienfuegos within the next few days.

"I think they're playing cat and mouse with us," one official commented privately.

Cuba

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NEW YORK

APES

SOVIET SHIPS NEAR CUBAN PORT AGAIN

U.S. Says Vessels Linked to
Base Report Are in Area

WASHINGTON, Nov. 9
(UPI) — The Pentagon said today that two Soviet ships that entered the Cuban port of Cienfuegos in September, giving rise to speculation about construction of a submarine base, were again nearing the port after a six-week absence.

Jerry W. Friedheim, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, said the submarine tender and salvage tug were being followed by the American destroyer escort Kretchmer and also watched by U-2 reconnaissance planes.

He declined to add any new details to earlier comments by defense officials that some sort of construction was apparently under way at Cienfuegos. Speculation that a base might be under construction has been denied by Tass, Soviet press agency.

Mr. Friedheim said it was not definite at this time that the two ships were returning to Cienfuegos, although their course apparently would take them there.

"We don't know what their intentions are, any more than we've known all along," he said. "They are in the vicinity of Cienfuegos. They are within a day of it. They are still in international waters."

Mr. Friedheim confirmed that two Soviet barges that had been at Cienfuegos since September were still there and that American U-2 planes were keeping the port under close surveillance.

"I'm not at liberty to discuss activity at Cienfuegos harbor any more than I have been over the last couple of weeks," he added.

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Two Russian Ships Leave Port in Cuba

Associated Press

Two Russian ships—a submarine tender and salvage tug—have left the Cuban port of Mariel and are now at sea, the Defense Department reported yesterday.

The two vessels were cited by the Pentagon in September when it said the Russians appeared to be building a submarine support base at Cienfuegos, a deep-water port on Cuba's southern coast.

The Soviet Union denied the U.S. claims.

The Pentagon announced Oct. 13 that the two ships left Cienfuegos and said this made it less likely the Russians

were building a base there. A few days later the ships put in at Mariel, about 25 miles west of Havana.

Pentagon spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim said the vessels left Mariel over the weekend and "are now at sea east of Havana and moving easterly."

He refused to comment when asked if the Russians were continuing to build naval facilities at Cienfuegos.

There were unconfirmed reports last month of a secret understanding between Washington and Moscow in which the Russians reportedly agreed to stop their activities at Cienfuegos.

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SOVIET REPORTED TO YIELD ON CUBA

Equipment for a Submarine Base Would Be Removed

The United States and the Soviet Union are understood to have reached a secret understanding that the Russians would remove from Cienfuegos, Cuba, equipment for a base to serve missile-carrying submarines.

White House and State Department spokesman refused to comment yesterday on reports to that effect. But it was reliably learned that departure of two Soviet ships, a tug and a submarine tender, from Cienfuegos harbor on Oct. 10 was signaled that the Russians had started to carry out the understanding.

Details of the arrangement, still officially undisclosed, were reportedly worked out in secret diplomatic contacts in Washington and Moscow late in September and early this month after the White House issued a stern warning that Moscow must abide by the pledge Nikita S. Khrushchev made when Premier to keep offensive missiles out of Cuba.

Promised to Raise Issue

Secretary of State William P. Rogers said at a news conference on Oct. 9 that he would discuss Washington's concern that the Russians might be building a submarine base at Cienfuegos with Andrei A. Gromyko when he met with the Soviet Foreign Minister. But American officials said the matter was not brought up when the two men conferred last Friday night and probably would not come up when they meet again tomorrow night.

The reason, it was learned, was that Moscow and Washington had already exchanged public as well as private signals to confirm the secret understanding.

The point of concern, underscored by the White House on Sept. 25, was the presence of four Soviet vessels—a tugboat, a submarine tender and two barges for servicing nuclear-armed submarines—in Cienfuegos harbor, along with the construction of some barracks on shore.

The White House, recalling the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the understanding between Premier Khrushchev and President Kennedy, warned Moscow that it would "view the establishment of a strategic base in the Caribbean with the utmost seriousness."

Soviet Denied Charge

The first public indication that the dispute was easing came on Oct. 13. On that day Tass, the official Soviet press agency, issued an authoritative statement saying the American charges that a submarine base was being constructed in Cuba were "a concoction."

Tass went on to add, significantly: "The Soviet Union has not built and is not building its own military base on Cuba and is not doing anything that would contradict the understanding between the governments of the U.S.S.R. and the United States."

On instructions from the White House, the State Department welcomed the Tass statement as a "positive" development. The Pentagon also disclosed that two of the Soviet vessels, the submarine tender and the tug, had already left Cienfuegos harbor and had sailed to the northern shore of the island, apparently on her way home. These statements were evidently public confirmation of the private understanding.

Some American officials were concerned that the two vessels stopped in Mariel, a harbor west of Havana, and that the two barges, considered by some specialists the most serious element in the Soviet buildup, were still in Cienfuegos yesterday.

But White House sources said that they considered the situation to be as "positive" as it was Oct. 13, when the Defense Department disclosed the departure of the two Soviet vessels from Cienfuegos.

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Soviets Deny Building Cuba Submarine Base

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Soviet Union officially "to be positive," but added that and emphatically denied yesterday that it was constructing a base for missile-firing submarines in Cuba.

An official government statement distributed by Tass, the Soviet news agency, said "The Soviet Union is not building a military base in Cuba and is not doing anything that would contradict the understanding reached between the governments of the U.S.S.R. and the United States in 1962."

During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets agreed to pull their missiles out of Cuba in return for what they say was an American pledge not to invade Cuba.

At the State Department, spokesman Robert J. McCloskey said the department considered the Tass statement

the United States "will continue to watch the situation" around the Cuban port of Cienfuegos closely.

The Tass report came just hours before the Pentagon announced that a Soviet submarine tender that had been in port in Cienfuegos since Sept. 9 had left Saturday morning and was heading eastward toward open sea.

High-level defense officials say the departure of the tender is the most significant break in the activities around Cienfuegos since the White House and the Pentagon both publicly accused the Soviets on Sept. 25 of possibly preparing the harbor there to service Russian missile-firing submarines.

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Assistant Secretary of Defense Daniel Z. Henkin said yesterday that departure of the tender "makes it less likely" that the Cuban port could be used in this fashion.

Though defense officials remain cautious about Russian intentions in the area, they also believe the tender's departure may be linked to a Soviet desire not to damage either the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, which are to reopen in Helsinki Nov. 2, or forthcoming meetings in New York this Friday and the following Monday between U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Soviet Foreign Minister Andri Gromyko.

The two major U.S. Polaris submarine bases overseas at Holy Loch, Scotland, and Rota, Spain, both have tenders in port at all times, and the continued presence of the Soviet tender in Cuba had increased speculation that a permanent sub base of this type as to be set up.

In a news conference Monday, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird pointed out that the two U.S. bases were well known before the U.S. and U.S.S.R. agreed to meet last fall to discuss strategic arms limitation.

Any attempt by the Soviets to change the balance now that the talks are under way would be viewed as "a very serious act," Laird said.

Whether the Soviets ever really intended to set up a sub base in Cuba, or still harbor such plans, remains open to considerable doubt.

Though Laird said Monday that "there is evidence naval base construction is going forward," neither the White House nor the Pentagon has claimed or produced any hard evidence linking activity there specifically with "Yankee-class," missile-firing submarines of the type that already patrol off the U.S. east coast from bases in Russia.

Intelligence officials say privately that there is no such

evidence and several senators, including J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), Clifford Case (R-N.J.), and Frank Church (D-Idaho), all of whom are normally skeptical of Pentagon claims, emerged from a special Senate Foreign Relations Committee briefing by the Defense Intelligence Agency Oct. 1 and reported insufficient evidence was presented, in their view, to conclude the Soviets were in fact building such a base.

On the other hand, it is possible, as some administration sources say, that the Soviets did indeed intend to put such a facility in, but may now have been dissuaded by stern U.S. warnings.

There are, according to intelligence officials, some new buildings at the Cienfuegos port, but it is impossible to tell at this time what purpose they serve.

The Soviets, they point out, are still in a position to change their plans for Cienfuegos before the U.S. can gather any actual evidence of sub base construction. Unlike the 1962 missile crisis, no before-and-after photos of activity in Cuba have been made public.

Further evidence that the situation was cooling off, militarily if not politically, came yesterday when administration officials, invited to testify on the Cuban affair in closed session on Capitol Hill, failed to show up.

Rep. Dante B. Fascell (D-Fla.), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs that had scheduled the meetings, said in an interview:

"I am not suggesting that there are any domestic political motives present in the administration's approach to the Cuban affair, but I do find it exceedingly strange that the discussion of a matter which is alleged to be of such grave importance as to threaten our national and international security should be conducted strictly between high administration officials and the press."